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The ethic of ‘priority’ is a compromise between the extremely compen-
satory ethic of ‘welfare equality’ and the needs-blind ethic of ‘income
equality’. We propose an axiom of priority, and characterize resource-
allocation rules that are impartial, prioritarian, and solidaristic. They
comprise a class of rules which equalize across individuals some index
of resources and welfare. Consequently, we provide an ethical ratio-
nalization for the many applications in which such indices have been
used (e.g., the ‘human development index,’ ‘index of primary goods,’
etc.). (JEL numbers: D63, D71.)
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11 Introduction
In this paper, we study the ethics of resource allocation in a basic and com-
mon problem. There is a resource, available in given quantity, to be allocated
among individuals, each of whom possesses a capability to transform the re-
source into some given valued outcome, and the achievements of individuals,
with regard to that outcome, are interpersonally comparable. The data of
the problem are (N,(ui)i∈N,W),w h e r eN is the group of individuals in the
population to be served, W ∈ R+ is the resource budget, and ui : R+ → R+
is the function which describes the capacity of individual i ∈ N to convert
the resource into the desired outcome.
In many resource allocation problems of this sort, there are two focal
points of distribution: to distribute the available resource equally among
all who need it, and to distribute the resource among the population so as
to equalize the outcomes among them. Often, however, the ‘equal-resource’
allocation seems too harsh: it does not take into account the diﬀerential
ability of individuals to convert the resource into the desired outcome. On
the other hand, often the equal-outcome allocation seems too extreme: it
may require giving the lion’s share of the resource to very ‘handicapped’
individuals, ones with poor outcome functions, and this may appear to be
unfair to those who are more fortunate. This is a familiar criticism of the
Rawlsian maximin allocation.
The philosopher Derek Parﬁt, partly as a reaction to the extremism of
Rawlsian maximin, coined the term ‘priority’ for the view that lies ‘in be-
tween’ the equal-resource and the equal-outcome view. He proposed that the
right view is to give priority to those who are less capable of transforming
resource into outcome. (Parﬁt did not work on a formal domain of problems,
so we are paraphrasing here.) We formalize Parﬁt’s view in the following
axiom:
Priority:L e txi denote the amount of resources allocated to individual i.I f
xi <x j then ui(xi) ≥ uj(xj).
2Priority says that no individual can dominate another in both resources
and outcomes. In particular, individuals with a worse capability of transform-
ing resources into outcomes are allocated more resources, a desirable feature
according to Sen (1973). It is intuitively clear that priority admits a large
class of possible resource allocations —just think of the possible compromises
between the equal-resource and the equal-outcome allocation. Prioritarian-
ism includes —it would seem as polar cases— those two allocations or allocation
rules.
There is a second principle that we believe characterizes fairness in many
problems, which we call solidarity. The idea is that, if an allocation rule is
fair, then when new individuals join a society (e.g., through birth or immigra-
tion) then the resources allocated to all the original members should change
in the same direction. Intuitively, if the new members bring with them a
lot of resources, then everyone in the original population should gain, and
if they bring with them few or no resources, then everyone in the original
population should chip in some resource to help them. We formalize this
axiom as follows:
Solidarity.L e tN ⊆ N0.I fx =( xi)i∈N and x0 =( xi)i∈N0 =( xN,x N0\N) are
the allocation vectors for (N,(ui)i∈N,W) and (N0,(ui)i∈N0,W0) respectively,
then either x = xN, x>x N or x<x N.
The solidarity axiom has been used in diﬀerent forms by Thomson (1983),
Roemer (1986), Moulin (1987), Chun (1996), Sprumont (1996) and Fleur-
baey and Maniquet (1999), among others. This axiom implies the axiom of
consistency, an axiom that has received considerable attention in decision
problems and in the theory of distributive justice (see, for instance, Young,
1994; Roemer, 1996; Moulin, 2003; Thomson, 2004; and the literature cited
therein).
Finally, we believe that fairness requires impartiality.T h i s m e a n s t h a t
in deciding how to allocate the resource, we ignore all attributes of persons
that are irrelevant, according to our moral standard, to the problem at hand.
For instance, if the problem is one of allocating scarce rescuer time to saving
3earthquake victims, we ignore the victim’s religion and race (though perhaps
not his age). In reality, impartiality is a very strong requirement. Suppose
t h ei s s u ei st od i s t r i b u t ee d u c a t i o n a lr e s o u r c e st oc h i l d r e n ,w h oh a v ed i ﬀerent
capacities to transform them into future earning power. One might say that
impartiality requires that the allocation rule ignore the wealth of parents.
However, the allocation rule that allocates such resources in the United States
surely does not ignore parental wealth.
We state the impartiality axiom as:
Impartiality.A l l o c a t i o nr u l e sa r ed e ﬁned on economic environments (N,(ui)i∈N,W).
H e r ea r es o m ee x a m p l e sw h e r e ,w eb e l i e v e ,t h ea x i o m so fs o l i d a r i t y ,p r i o r -
ity and impartiality either apply in common practice, or, arguably, morality
suggests that they should apply:
1. The resource W is parental time allocated to children, and ui(xi) is the
(predicted) success of child i if he receives parental time xi. Solidarity
says that when a new child arrives in the family, parental time to all
the other children changes in the same way (decreases, here); priority
says that, generally, a parent should devote more time to children who
are less able, but not to the extent of rendering those children more
successful than more able children.
2. Distribution of a parent’s estate among children. The same ideas apply
as in #1. Here, equal division of the estate is commonly done, which
is consistent with solidarity and priority.
3. The resource W is the budget of educational ﬁnance; ui(xi) is, perhaps,
the predicted future wage of a child of type i if she receives xi in edu-
cational ﬁnance. Priority says that we should devote at least as much
educational resource to children who have inferior abilities to transform
the resource into future earning power.
4. The Americans with Disabilities Act requires employers to spend extra
resources to enable disabled workers to perform adequately on the job.
4Here, ui(xi) might be the degree of success on the job.
The reader can doubtless supply many more examples.
An example that does not satisfy priority is triage on the battleﬁeld. The
resource is physician time; ui(xi) is the probability of survival of wounded
soldier i. The army’s goal is to maximize the number of soldiers who survive,
and can return to battle; it will devote no resources to badly wounded soldiers
for whom the function ui is very poor. Note that fairness is not the issue
here, but maximizing the eﬀectiveness of the army.
Consider, however, the victims of an earthquake, where the resource is
scarce rescuer time. ui is the probability-of-survival function for person i
where the argument is rescuer time devoted to saving i. Should the allocation
of rescuer time satisfy priority, or is this a case like triage? It depends whether
our objective is fairness towards individuals or to maximize the number of
people saved. If it is fairness, then priority applies. It is intuitively clear
that the most ‘conservative’ prioritarian practice would be to give all victims
equal time; the most ‘radical’ would be to allocate the time among victims
so that all have an equal probability of survival. Priority says that in no case
do we allocate so much rescuer time to a more badly trapped victim that we
increase his survival probability above the survival probability of a less badly
trapped victim.
In this paper, we characterize, on a domain of possible problems, the set of
allocation rules that jointly satisfy priority, solidarity, and impartiality. The
intuitions that we have hinted at are veriﬁed: there is a large class of such
rules, and the equal-resource and equal-outcome rules are polar cases in that
class, on the ‘conservative’ and ‘radical’ ends. The admissible class turns out
to involve indices of resources and outcomes. To be precise, we will show that
t h et h r e ea x i o m sr e q u i r eu st oe q u a l i z esome index of resources and outcomes,
at the highest possible level. In particular, these rules pay equal attention to
resources and outcomes in an explicit way; they are not ‘welfarist’ rules that
consider only the pattern of outcomes that resource allocations generate. As
such, this work is a contribution to non-welfarist social-choice theory. Indeed,
5the non-welfarist aspect of our approach is evident in the priority axiom: for
that axiom implements a special moral concern for the amount of resource
that a person receives. (That claim is vague, but we hope the reader agrees
with us.)
Using indices of resources and outcomes to measure the success of an
allocation procedure is a fairly common practice. The UNDP’s human de-
velopment indicator is an index of a country’s GDP, literacy rate, and in-
fant mortality rate. John Rawls (1971) worked, famously, with an index of
primary goods: some of those ‘good’ were resources, and some ‘outcomes.’
Amartya Sen (1980, 1992) has written of using an index of functionings as
a possible measure of a person’s welfare. In these examples, the social wel-
fare supremum is thought to be the allocation of resources that equalizes the
index in question, at the highest possible level. This is our characterization
theorem.
In part one of the duo of papers of which this is second, we explored
what is perhaps the most famous approach to implementing impartiality in
ethics, the veil of ignorance. Our study led us to the view that that approach
violated prioritarianism, which we take to be an ethical requirement. This
paper continues that research program, in asking what allocation rules do
satisfy prioritarianism and impartiality —and another axiom that we consider
to be ethically desirable, solidarity. Further comments will follow in our
conclusion.
From the viewpoint of ethics, the priority axiom implements Parﬁt’s at-
tempt to ﬁnd a compromise between ignoring capabilities of persons, in the
assignment of resources, and going (what some consider to be) overboard
with regard to achieving outcome equality. As such, our characterization
theorem tells us what the ethics of compromise, so viewed, require.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the
axiomatic theory of resource allocation involving the concepts of impartiality,
solidarity, and priority. In Section 3 we characterize the family of rules
satisfying these three notions and in Section 4 we focus on two important
6rules within the family: the equal-resource rule and the equal-welfare rule.
Section 5 concludes. Most of the proofs have been relegated to an Appendix.
2T h e m o d e l
Let N = {1,2,3,...} represent a population of all potential individuals and
let N be a collection of ﬁnite subsets of N.L e tN = {1,2,...,n} ∈ N be a
set of individuals with generic elements i and j. Individuals derive welfare
from a resource, called wealth. We assume that N × R+ is endowed with
a complete order. The expression (i,W) % (j,W0) is read: “individual i
equipped with wealth W enjoys a welfare level at least as high as individual
j equipped with wealth W0”. We assume that this order is continuous in W,
and satisﬁes that, for any i,j ∈ N and W ∈ R+ t h e r ei saw e a l t hl e v e lW0
such that (i,W) ∼ (j,W0). We further assume that for any pair i,j ∈ N,
(i,0) ∼ (j,0). A wealth level of zero can be thought of as inducing death,
which is an equally bad outcome for all individuals. Finally, we assume that
welfare is strictly increasing in wealth for every individual.
It is convenient to represent this interpersonally level comparable welfare
ordering as follows. Fix a particular individual and call her individual 0.
For any other individual i deﬁne a function ui : R+ → R+ where for each
W ∈ R+, ui(W) is such that
(0,u i(W)) ∼ (i,W)
In other words, ui(W) is the wealth that 0 must receive in order that she
enjoy the same level of welfare as individual i enjoys with wealth W.1 We
say that an individual is more able than another one if the former needs less
wealth than the latter one to reach the same level of welfare. Formally,
An individual i is able with respect to an individual j if ui ≥ uj and ui 6=
uj. We also say that, in this case, individual j is disabled with respect to
individual i.
1In particular, u0 is the identity function.
7Two individuals are comparable i fo n ei sa tl e a s ta sa b l ea st h eo t h e r .
Obviously, there might be individuals who are not comparable.
The assumptions on % tell us that for all i, ui is a continuous strictly
increasing unbounded function satisfying that ui(0) = 0.2 We say that a
family of functions constitutes a dense domain if the graphs of these functions
cover the positive quadrant. We shall assume that {ui : i ∈ N} constitutes a
dense domain. Formally,
Dense Domain. {ui : i ∈ N} is a dense domain, i.e., for every (a,b) ∈ R2
++
there exists an individual i ∈ N such that ui(a)=b.
We deﬁne an economy e as a triple (N,u,W),w h e r eN ∈ N is the
set of individuals, u =( ui)i∈N is the proﬁle of utility functions (deﬁned as
above) for individuals in N,a n dW ∈ R+ represents the available wealth.
The family of all economies is E.
2.1 Allocation rules
An allocation rule is a function F that associates to each economy e =




W. That is, an allocation rule indicates how to distribute the wealth available
in an economy among its members.
Examples of rules are the following: First, the rules that assign all the
available wealth to a unique individual in the economy.




W if i = j,
0 otherwise.
.
Next, the rule that awards each agent the same amount:
Equal-Resource rule (ER): ERi(N,u,W)=W
n .
An alternative to the equal-resource rule is obtained by focusing on the
welfare levels individuals achieve, as opposed to what resources they receive,
and choosing the vector at which these welfare levels are equal.
2Note that the functions ui comprise a proﬁle of utility functions for individuals which
measure utility in a level comparable way.
8Equal-Welfare rule (EW): EWi(N,u,W)=u
−1






Note that, for all i ∈ I, u
−1
i is a continuous strictly increasing unbounded
function satisfying that u
−1
i (0) = 0. From here, it follows that EW is well-
deﬁned.
Another possibility is to combine these rules depending on the cardinality
of the set of individuals. For instance,
Mixed rule (M): M(N,u,W)=
(
EW(N,u,W) if n =2 ,
ER(N,u,W) otherwise.
Finally, one could also implement the idea of proportionality to construct
an allocation rule. For instance,
Proportional rule (P): P(N,u,W)=λ · (u
−1





i (1) = W
λ .
2.2 Axioms
We now present the axioms we want rules to satisfy. These axioms will reﬂect
the three notions discussed above: impartiality, priority and solidarity.
First, it is worth mentioning that by deﬁning rules on the class of economies
E we are excluding much information about persons that we consider ethi-
cally irrelevant. In doing so, we are implicitly modeling impartiality.
We now turn to priority.O u r a x i o m o fpriority says that no agent can
dominate another agent both in resources and welfare.
Priority (PR) Let e =( N,u,W) ∈ E and i,j ∈ N such that Fi(e) <F j(e).
Then ui(Fi(e)) ≥ uj(Fj(e)).
Note that this axiom guarantees that disabled agents receive at least as
much wealth as abler ones: we discriminate positively towards the disabled.
In other words, priority implies the weak equity axiom introduced by Sen
(1973). On the other hand, the axiom also says that the obligation towards
9the unfortunate is limited, as a disabled person is never resourced to the ex-
tent that her welfare exceeds that of an able agent. It is also straightforward
to show that priority implies a weak version of anonymity which says that
individuals that are equally able are rewarded equally.
We conclude with solidarity. H e r ew er e l yu p o nal i t e r a t u r ew h i c hh a s
formulated various solidarity axioms in the past twenty years. Alternative
versions of solidarity have been considered in diﬀerent contexts like fair divi-
sion (e.g., Thomson, 1983; Roemer, 1986), social choice (e.g., Chun, 1986),
compensation problems (e.g., Moulin, 1987; Fleurbaey and Maniquet, 1999),
bankruptcy problems (e.g., Chun, 1989), surplus-sharing (e.g., Keiding and
Moulin, 1991), collective choice (e.g., Sprumont, 1996; Ehlers and Klaus,
2001), or house allocation (e.g., Ehlers and Klaus, 2004). Our notion of sol-
idarity says that the arrival of immigrants, whether or not accompanied by
changes in the available wealth, should aﬀect all original agents in the same
direction: all gain or all lose, or all receive the same as before.
Solidarity (SL). Let e =( N,u,W) ∈ E and e0 =( N0,u 0,W0) ∈ E, such that
N0 ⊆ N. Let FN0(e) denote the projection of F(e) onto the set of coordinates
corresponding to N0.T h e ne i t h e rF(e0)=FN0(e), F(e0) >F N0(e) or F(e0) <
FN0(e).3
Note that solidarity implies that when a bad or good shock comes to
an economy, all its members should share in the calamity or windfall. This
property is usually known as resource monotonicity (e.g., Roemer, 1986). It
is also straightforward to show that solidarity implies consistency,ap r o p e r t y
that says that if a sub-group of individuals secedes with the resource allocated
to it under a rule, then in the smaller economy the rule allocates the resource
in the same way. The reader is referred to Young (1994), Roemer (1996) or
Thomson (2004) for the many applications that exist in the literature on
distributive justice concerning this notion.
3Note that for x =( x1,...,xn) ∈ Rn and y =( y1,...,yn) ∈ Rn,w ew r i t ex>yif xi >y i
for all i =1 ,...,n.
103 A characterization result
Among the rules introduced in Section 2.1 only the equal-resource and the
equal-welfare rules satisfy solidarity and priority. The purpose of this section
is to identify all the remaining existing rules satisfying these properties.
Let Φ be the class of functions composed of all functions ϕ : R2
++ ∪
{(0,0)} → R+, continuous on its domain and non-decreasing, such that
inf{ϕ(x,y)} = ϕ(0,0) = 0 and for all (x,y) > (z,t), ϕ(x,y) >ϕ (z,t).L e tϕ
be a function in the class Φ.F o ra l li ∈ N deﬁne the function ψi : R+ → R+
that determines the ϕ−value agent i achieves, depending on the wealth she
receives, i.e., ψi(w)=ϕ(w,ui(w)) for all w ∈ R+. Then, we deﬁne the
corresponding index-egalitarian r u l ea st h er u l et h a te q u a l i z e st h eϕ value
across individuals in an economy.










Note that, for all i ∈ I, ψ
−1
i is a continuous strictly increasing unbounded
function satisfying that ψ
−1
i (0) = 0. From here, it follows that Eϕ is well
deﬁned. Note also that applied in this manner to an agent’s wealth and
welfare, ϕ can be considered to be a generalized index of wealth and welfare.
So the rules just deﬁned equalize a generalized index of wealth and welfare.4
All the rules within the family {Eϕ}ϕ∈Φ satisfy solidarity and priority.
More remarkably, there is no other rule satisfying these two properties si-
multaneously, as the next result shows.
Theorem 1 Ar u l eF satisﬁes solidarity and priority if and only if F ∈
{Eϕ}ϕ∈Φ.
Theorem 1 shows that impartiality, solidarity and priority are equivalent
to a kind of egalitarianism, where the equality in question is equality of a
conception of well-being that is some general index of welfare and resources.
In particular, prioritarianism, at least in conjunction with solidarity, does
4We are indebted in a major way to Klaus Nehring, who suggested the Eϕ rules.
11not preclude equality, but it modiﬁes the equalisandum from ‘welfare’ to an
index of welfare and resources.
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m1 .
It is easy to show that all the Eϕ rules satisfy SL and PR.C o n v e r s e l y ,
let F be a rule that satisﬁes SL and PR. We show that there exists ϕ ∈ Φ
such that F = Eϕ. First, a preliminary lemma.
Lemma 1 For i,j ∈ N and α>0 ﬁxed, there exists W ∈ R+ such that
Fi({i,j},(ui,u j),W)=α.
We now introduce some notation. Let i ∈ N be given and α ∈ R+.
Let E(F,i,α) be the domain of economies for which individual i obtains an
amount of wealth α, under rule F. Formally:
E(F,i,α)={e =( N,u,W) ∈ E : Fi(e)=α}.
Let C(F,i,α) be the set of points in the plane which are achieved as wealth-
welfare ordered pairs under the action of F on individuals who are members
of economies in E(F,i,α).F o r m a l l y :
C(F,i,α)={(a,b) ∈ R
2
+ : ∃e =( N,u,W) ∈ E(F,i,α), j ∈ N s.t. (a,b)=( Fj(e),u j(Fj(e)))}.
Our aim is to show that the family of curves {C(F,i,α):α ∈ R+} is the
i s o q u a n tm a po fa na p p r o p r i a t ef u n c t i o nϕ ∈ Φ and therefore to show that
F = Eϕ.
Lemma 2 If α1 6= α2 then C(F,i,α1) ∩ C(F,i,α2)=∅.
Let (a,b) ∈ R2
+ be given. By the assumption of dense domain, and
Lemma 1, there exists α ∈ R+ such that (a,b) ∈ C(F,i,α).B yL e m m a2 ,α
is unique. Deﬁne then the function ϕ : R2
++ ∪ {(0,0)} → R+ by ϕ(a,b)=α,
where α ∈ R+ i st h eu n i q u en u m b e rf o rw h i c h(a,b) ∈ C(F,i,α). Then,
Lemma 3 Let ϕ deﬁned as above. Then, ϕ ∈ Φ.
12We show now that F = Eϕ, i.e., F(N,u,W)=Eϕ(N,u,W) for all
(N,u,W) ∈ E.F i xe =( N,u,W) ∈ E. Two cases are distinguished.
Case 1: i ∈ N.
Let λ = Fi(e).T h e n , (Fj(e),u j(Fj(e))) ∈ C(F,i,λ) for all j ∈ N.B y
deﬁnition of ϕ, ϕ(Fj(e),u j(Fj(e))) = λ,f o ra l lj ∈ N.T h u s ,ψj(Fj(e)) = λ
for all j ∈ N.S i n c e
P
j∈N Fj(e)=W, it follows that F(e)=Eϕ(e).
Case 2: i/ ∈ N.
Pick two agents j,k ∈ N \{ i}.L e t wj = Fj(e) and wk = Fk(e).
By Lemma 1, there are two economies b e =( {i,j},(ui,u j),c W) and e e =
({i,k},(ui,u k),f W) such that wj = Fj(b e) and wk = Fk(e e);l e tb wi = Fi(b e)
and e wi = Fi(e e).
Claim. C(F,j,wj)=C(F,i, b wi) and C(F,k,wk)=C(F,i, e wi).
P r o o fo ft h ec l a i m . We only show that C(F,j,wj)=C(F,i, b wi).T h e
proof of C(F,k,wk)=C(F,i, e wi) is identical.
Let (a,b) ∈ C(F,i, b wi). Then, there exists l ∈ N such that b = ul(a) and
(b wi,a)=( Fi(e2),F l(e2)),w h e r ee2 =( {i,l},(ui,u l), b wi + a). By a similar
argument to that of Lemma 1, there exists W3 such that Fi(e3)=b wi,w h e r e
e3 =( {i,j,l},(ui,u j,u l),W3). Then, b e,e2 and e3 belong to E(F,i, b wi).T h u s ,
by SL, a = Fl(e2)=Fl(e3) and wj = Fj(b e)=Fj(e3).C o n s e q u e n t l y , e3 ∈
E(F,j,wj) and (a,b) ∈ C(F,j,wj),s h o w i n gt h a tC(F,i, b wi) ⊆ C(F,j,wj).
Let (a,b) ∈ C(F,j,wj). Then, there exists l ∈ N such that b = ul(a) and
(wj,a)=( Fj(e2),F l(e2)),w h e r ee2 =( {j,l},(ui,u l),w j + a). By a similar
argument to that of Lemma 1, there exists W3 such that Fj(e3)=wj,w h e r e
e3 =( {i,j,l},(ui,u j,u l),W3). Then, b e,e2 and e3 belong to E(F,j,wj).T h u s ,
by SL, a = Fl(e2)=Fl(e3) and b wi = Fi(b e)=Fi(e3). Consequently, e3 ∈
E(F,i, b wi) and (a,b) ∈ C(F,i, b wi),s h o w i n gt h a tC(F,i, b wi) ⊇ C(F,j,wj).
This proves the claim.
Note that (wj,u j(wj)) ∈ C(F,j,wj) ∩ C(F,k,wk).S i n c e C(F,j,wj)=
C(F,i, b wi) and C(F,k,wk)=C(F,i, e wi),t h e n
(wj,u j(wj)) ∈ C(F,i, b wi) ∩ C(F,i, e wi).
13By Lemma 2, it follows that b wi = e wi = wi.T h u s ,C(F,j,wj)=C(F,i,wi)=
C(F,k,wk). Therefore all the points {(Fl(e),u l(Fl(e))) : l ∈ N} lie on the
wi-isoquant of ϕ,a n di tf o l l o w s ,a si nC a s e1 ,t h a tF coincides with Eϕ on
t h ee n t i r ed o m a i nE.
The reader might note that although we chose a speciﬁcp r o ﬁle of util-
ity functions to represent the interpersonal ordering %, the class of rules
characterized in Theorem 1 is independent of this choice.
4 Two important allocation rules
In this section we focus upon two rules within the family of {Eϕ}ϕ∈Φ rules.
The equal-resource (ER)r u l ei st h eEϕ1 rule, where ϕ1(x,y)=x.T h e
equal-welfare (EW)r u l ei st h eEϕ2 rule, where ϕ2(x,y)=y.T h eER rule
equalizes the wealth of individuals in all economies, whereas the EW rule
equalizes the welfare of individuals in all economies. These two rules are the
extreme prioritarian rules for the most able and the least able agents in an
economy. More precisely, ER is the best (worst) prioritarian rule for the
ablest (disablest) agent, whereas EW is the best (worst) prioritarian rule for
the disablest (ablest) agent.
Proposition 1 Let e =( N,u,W) ∈ E.L e t i (j) be the ablest (disablest)
individual in N.T h e n ,f o ra l lr u l e sF satisfying priority, we have:
(i) ERi(e) ≥ Fi(e) ≥ EWi(e)
(ii) ERj(e) ≤ Fj(e) ≤ EWj(e)
Proof.
Let F be a rule satisfying PR.L e t e =( N,u,W) ∈ E and let i (j)b e
the ablest (disablest) individual in N. We shall show (i). The proof of (ii) is
analogous.
Suppose, contrary to the claim, that ERi(e) <F i(e). Then, there exists
k ∈ N such that ERk(e) >F k(e).S i n c e ERk(e)=ERi(e),i tf o l l o w st h a t
Fi(e) >F k(e). Then, by PR, ui(Fi(e)) ≤ uk(Fk(e)). On the other hand,
14since i is the ablest individual in N, it follows that ui ≥ uk. Thus, by
monotonicity, ui(Fi(e)) >u i(Fk(e)) ≥ uk(Fk(e)), which is a contradiction.
Similarly, if Fi(e) <E W i(e),t h e r ee x i s t sk ∈ N such that EWk(e) <
Fk(e).S i n c e ui and uk are strictly increasing, it follows that ui(Fi(e)) <
ui(EWi(e)) = uk(EWk(e)) <u k(Fk(e)). Thus, by PR, Fi(e) ≥ Fk(e).N o w ,
since ui ≥ uk, it follows, by monotonicity, that ui(Fi(e)) ≥ ui(Fk(e)) ≥
uk(Fk(e)), which is a contradiction.
In particular, Proposition 1 shows that, for all ϕ ∈ Φ,
ERi(e) ≥ E
ϕ
i (e) ≥ EWi(e) and ERj(e) ≤ E
ϕ
j (e) ≤ EWj(e),
where i and j are, respectively, the ablest and disablest individuals in e.
We can deﬁne a duality relationship between the members of the {Eϕ}ϕ∈Φ
family as follows. For each ϕ ∈ Φ,l e tϕ∗ be deﬁned as ϕ∗(x,y)=ϕ(y,x).
Then, ϕ∗ ∈ Φ.W e d e ﬁne the dual rule of Eϕ as Eϕ∗. Eϕ and Eϕ∗ are
symmetric with respect to the treatment of wealth and welfare. Note that
ER and EW are dual rules.
5 Recapitulation
We have presented a characterization, in simple environments, of allocation
rules that satisfy impartiality, solidarity and priority. In particular, our result
resolves the tension that exists between impartiality and priority, that we
highlighted in part one of the duo of papers of which this is the second, when
one uses the veil of ignorance as the tool to enforce impartiality. Indeed,
we get something more: impartiality and priority, together with solidarity,
imply a kind of egalitarianism, where the index of wealth and welfare that is
equalized according to justice is not determined without further assumptions.
Two classical distribution rules are polar (and even ‘dual’) in the class of
index-egalitarian rules —the equal-resource and equal-welfare allocation rules.
To characterize the family of ‘index-egalitarian’ rules, we had to use not
only impartiality and priority, but something more, solidarity. This may be
15a disappointment to political philosophers often called ‘left-liberal’, a class
which includes such writers as John Rawls (1971), Brian Barry (1995), and
perhaps Thomas Scanlon (1998). For it has been a goal of that school to de-
duce egalitarianism from axioms which would attract almost universal assent
—like impartiality and perhaps priority. The title of Barry’s book, Justice as
Impartiality, even suggests that impartiality alone implies something close to
egalitarianism, as that is the kind of justice that he describes therein. The
solidarity axiom, which we have needed for our characterization, seems to be
itself quite radical, in that it insists upon a strong kind of cooperation among
citizens. We have therefore not derived equality from axioms which would
attract almost universal assent.
We conclude with some remarks linking this paper with Part 1, in which
we showed that the veil of ignorance, viewed as an allocation rule, was non-
prioritarian. Strictly speaking, the present paper is incomparable to that
one, because the domains of the resource-allocation rules are diﬀerent. In
Part 1, we included the risk preferences of the individuals as information in
the problem, as well as the level of resource and the interpersonal welfare
ordering. We would have liked to have characterized our index-egalitarian
rules on that domain, but that would be a much more diﬃcult task.
Regarding priority: What we, the ethical observers, consider a bad out-
come —having a society in which the disabled are less abundantly resourced
than the able— does not coincide with the bad outcome to the individual
behind the veil of ignorance who faces the birth lottery; the worst outcome
for her may be being born able without suﬃcient resources to fully exploit
that ability. This is, of course, why the veil sometimes (often) allocates less
wealth to the disabled than to the able, as we showed in Part 1. We have
not defended our axiom of priority: it is, after all, an axiom. To do so would
require a fully philosophical inquiry.
Appendix: Proofs of the lemmata
We assume throughout this appendix that F is an allocation rule satis-
16fying SL and PR.
P r o o fo fL e m m a1
Let i,j ∈ N and α>0 be given and denote e =( {i,j},(ui,u j),W) for
each W>0.S i n c e Fi(e) ≤ W,i tf o l l o w st h a t ,f o rW suﬃciently small,
Fi(e) <α .
Suppose that Fi(e) <αfor all e. Then, Fj(e) >W− α for all e and
therefore limW→∞ Fj(e)=∞. In particular, for all e such that W>2α,
Fj(e) >α>F i(e). Thus, by PR, ui(Fi(e)) ≥ uj(Fj(e)).S i n c eui is increas-
ing, ui(α) ≥ uj(Fj(e)) for all e such that W>2α. However, since uj is
unbounded, limW→∞uj(Fj(e)) = ∞, a contradiction.
Thus, there exist W1 and W2 such that Fi(e1) <αand Fi(e2) >α
for e1 =( {i,j},(ui,u j),W 1) and e2 =( {i,j},(ui,u j),W 2).C o n s i d e r t h e
following two sets:
Ω
< = {W ∈ (0,+∞):Fi(e) <α } and Ω
> = {W ∈ (0,+∞):Fi(e) >α }.
Then, W1 ∈ Ω< and W2 ∈ Ω>.T h u s ,
Ω
< 6= ∅ and Ω
> 6= ∅. (1)
Furthermore, it is obvious that
Ω
< ∩ Ω
> = ∅. (2)
We show now that
Ω
<and Ω
>are open sets. (3)
Claim. Ω< and Ω> are open sets.
P r o o fo ft h ec l a i m . Let W ∈ Ω< and α = Fi(e) <α .L e tε = α−α
2 .W e
show that (W − ε,W + ε) ⊂ Ω<.B y SL, (W − ε,W) ⊂ Ω<. Suppose, by
contradiction, that there exists W∗ ∈ (W,W + ε) such that W∗ / ∈ Ω<, i.e.,
Fi(e∗) ≥ α,f o re∗ =( {i,j},(ui,u j),W∗).B ySL, Fj(e∗) >F j(e)=W − α.
Then, W∗ = Fj(e∗)+Fi(e∗) >W−α+α = W +2ε, which contradicts that
W∗ ∈ (W,W + ε).T h i ss h o w st h a tΩ< is an open set.
17Let W ∈ Ω> and α = Fi(e) >α .L e t ε = α−α
2 . We show that (W −
ε,W + ε) ⊂ Ω>.B y SL, (W, W + ε) ⊂ Ω>. Suppose, by contradiction,
that there exists W∗ ∈ (W − ε,W) such that W∗ / ∈ Ω>, i.e., Fi(e∗) ≤ α,
for e∗ =( {i,j},(ui,u j),W∗).B y SL, Fj(e∗) <F j(e)=W − α. Then,
W∗ = Fj(e∗)+Fi(e∗) <W− α + α = W − 2ε, which contradicts that
W∗ ∈ (W − ε,W).T h i s s h o w s t h a t Ω> is an open set, which proves the
claim.




Finally, (1), (2), (3) and (4) together say that (0,+∞) is not connected,
which is a contradiction.
P r o o fo fL e m m a2
We show ﬁr s tt h a ta n yC(F,i,α) is downward sloping, i.e., if (a,b),
(a0,b 0) ∈ C(F,i,α) and a0 >athen b0 ≤ b. Suppose, to the contrary, that
b0 >b .B y d e ﬁnition, there exist e =( N,u,W) and e0 =( N0,u 0,W0) ∈
E(F,i,α) and j ∈ N, k ∈ N0 such that (a,b)=( Fj(e),u j(Fj(e))), (a0,b 0)=
(Fk(e0),u k(Fk(e0))). As well, there is a wealth W∗ such that e∗ =( {i,j,k},(ui,u j,u k),W∗) ∈
E(F,i,α) ( s a m ea r g u m e n ta sL e m m a1 ) .B ySL, we know that Fj(e∗)=a,
Fk(e∗)=a0 and so Fj(e∗) <F k(e∗). Thus, by PR, uj(Fj(e∗)) ≥ uk(Fk(e∗)).
However, we also know that, by hypothesis, b = uj(Fj(e∗)) <u k(Fk(e∗)) = b0,
a contradiction.
We show now that {C(F,i,α):α ∈ R+} is a collection of disjoint sets. Let
α1 >α 2.S u p p o s e(a,b) ∈ C(F,i,α1) ∩ C(F,i,α2).L e te1 =( N1,u 1,α 1) ∈
E(F,i,α1), e2 =( N2,u 2,α 2) ∈ E(F,i,α2) and j ∈ N1,k∈ N2 such that
(a,b)=( Fj(e1),u j(Fj(e1))) = (Fk(e2),u k(Fk(e2))). Consider the economies
b e1 =( {i,j},(ui,u j),a+ α1) and b e2 =( {i,k},(ui,u k),a+ α2). SL implies
that Fi(b e1)=α1 and Fi(b e2)=α2. By a similar argument to that of Lemma
1, there is a W>a + α2 such that e e2 =( {i,k},(ui,u k),W) ∈ E(F,i,α1).
By SL, applied to b e2 and e e2 we know that Fk(e e2) >F k(b e2)=a. Therefore,
18(a,b) < (Fk(e e2),u k(Fk(e e2))) ∈ C(F,i,α1). This contradicts the fact that
C(F,i,α1) is downward sloping.
We need additional machinery to prove Lemma 3.
Of two sets A and B in the plane we say that B lies above A if
1. For all (a1,a 2) ∈ A there exists (b1,b 2) ∈ B such that (a1,a 2) < (b1,b 2).
2 .T h e r ei sn o(a1,a 2) ∈ A and (b1,b 2) ∈ B such that (b1,b 2) < (a1,a 2).
Clearly, if B lies above A,t h e nA does not lie above B.
Claim. If α1 >α 2 then C(F,i,α1) lies above C(F,i,α2).
P r o o fo ft h ec l a i m . Let (a,b) ∈ C(F,i,α2),a n dl e te =( {i,j},(ui,u j),W) ∈
E(F,i,α2) such that Fj(e)=a, uj(Fj(e)) = b.S i n c e Fi(e)=α2,a n db ya
similar argument to that of the proof of 1, increasing the wealth from its value
in e, we eventually ﬁnd a wealth value W∗ such that e∗ =( {i,j},(ui,u j),W∗) ∈
E(F,i,α1).L e t (a0,b 0)=( Fj(e∗),u j(Fj(e∗))). Then, (a0,b 0) ∈ C(F,i,α1).
Furthermore, since F satisﬁes SLand uj is strictly increasing, (a0,b 0) > (a,b).
Conversely, let (a,b) ∈ C(F,i,α1). Suppose there were a point (a00,b 00) ∈
C(F,i,α2) such that (a00,b 00) > (a,b). We know that there is a point (α1,d 1)
in C(F,i,α1)—because (Fi(e),u i(Fi(e))) = (α1,d 1) for any e in E(F,i,α1)—
and in like manner there is a point (α2,d 2) ∈ C(F,i,α2),a n dd1 = ui(α1) >
ui(α2)=d2 (because both points are associated with agent i). Thus we have
C(F,i,α1) Ä (α1,d 1) > (α2,d 2) ∈ C(F,i,α2),
C(F,i,α2) Ä (a00,b 00) > (a,b) ∈ C(F,i,α1)
(5)
Without loss of generality, assume that α2 <a 00. Then, it follows that
α2 <α 1 <a<a 00.5
Let Λ(C(F,i,α)) be the support of the curve C(F,i,α), i.e., the wealth
values for which there exist welfare levels such that the pairs are achieved
under the action of F.F o r m a l l y :
Λ(C(F,i,α)) = {a ∈ R+ : ∃ b ∈ R+ s.t. (a,b) ∈ C(F,i,α)}.
5If α2 >a 00,t h e na<a 00 <α 2 <α 1, and the ensuing argument would be analogous.
19Similarly, let Γ(C(F,i,α)) be the range of the curve C(F,i,α), i.e., the
welfare levels for which there exist wealth values such that the pairs are
achieved under the action of F. Formally,
Γ(C(F,i,α)) = {b ∈ R+ : ∃ a ∈ R+ s.t. (a,b) ∈ C(F,i,α)}.
For k =1 ,2,l e tγk : Λ(C(F,i,αk)) → R+ be the mapping whose graph
coincides with the curve C(F,i,α), i.e., Gr(γ)=C(F,i,α).6 Then, by (5)
and the fact that C(F,i,αk) are downward sloping, we have
max{γ2(α1)} ≤ min{γ2(α2)} ≤ max{γ2(α2)} < min{γ1(α1)} and
min{γ2(a)} ≥ max{γ2(a00)} ≥ min{γ2(a00)} > max{γ1(a)}.
(6)
Assume we know that all C(F,i,α) sets are connected. Then, both
Gr(γ1)=C(F,i,α1) and Gr(γ2)=C(F,i,α2) are connected sets. So are
their supports and therefore
(α1,a) ⊂ Λ(C(F,i,α1)) ∩ Λ(C(F,i,α2)).
Since max{γ2(α1)} < min{γ1(α1)} and min{γ2(a)} > max{γ1(a)},i tf o l l o w s
that there exists x ∈ (α1,a) such that γ1(x) ∩ γ2(x) 6= ∅, which means that
C(F,i,α1) ∩ C(F,i,α2) 6= ∅. This contradicts Lemma 2.
Thus, it just remains to show that a C(F,i,α) set is connected. Since
C(F,i,α) is downward sloping, it follows that if it is not connected then
either Λ(C(F,i,α)) is not connected or Γ(C(F,i,α)) is not connected.
Case 1: Λ(C(F,i,α)) is not connected.
Let a,b ∈ Λ(C(F,i,α)) such that a<band λ·a+(1−λ)b/ ∈ Λ(C(F,i,α))
for all λ ∈ (0,1).S i n c e C(F,i,α) is downward sloping, it follows that
min{γ(a)} ≥ max{γ(b)}.F i xb λ ∈ (0,1) and let b x = b λ·a+(1−b λ)b.C o n s i d e r
θ =
min{γ(a)}
x and let uj(x)=θ · x, for all x ∈ R+. Then,
max{γ(b)} ≤ uj(b x)=m i n {γ(a)}.
6Note that γ may well be a multi-valued function.
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C(F,i,α).T h u s ,uj(w) ∩ γ(w) 6= ∅.
Now, since C(F,i,α) is downward sloping, we have that
y<u j(b x) for all y ∈ γ(x) such that x ∈ Λ(C(F,i,α)) and x>b ,
and
y>u j(b x) for all y ∈ γ(x) such that x ∈ Λ(C(F,i,α)) and x<a .
Since uj is strictly increasing, it follows that uj(x) and γ(x) do not cross,
which is a contradiction.
Case 2: Γ(C(F,i,α)) is not connected.
Let a,b ∈ Γ(C(F,i,α)) such that a<band λ·a+(1−λ)b/ ∈ Γ(C(F,i,α))
for all λ ∈ (0,1). Assume there exists x such that {a,b} ⊂ γ(x).7 Fix
b λ ∈ (0,1) and let θ =
b λ·a+(1−b λ)b
x .C o n s i d e r uj(x)=θ · x,f o ra l lx ∈ R+.
Then, uj ∈ U and uj(b x)=b λ·a+(1−b λ)b. We know, by Lemma 1, that there
exists w ∈ R+ such that (w,uj(w)) ∈ C(F,i,α).T h u s ,uj(w) ∩ γ(w) 6= ∅.
Now, since C(F,i,α) is downward sloping, it follows that
y<u j(b x) for all y ∈ γ(x) such that x ∈ Λ(C(F,i,α)) and x>b x,
and
y>u j(b x) for all y ∈ γ(x) such that x ∈ Λ(C(F,i,α)) and x<b x.
Since uj is strictly increasing, it follows that uj(x) and γ(x) do not cross,
which is a contradiction. This completes the proof of the claim.
P r o o fo fL e m m a3
Since F satisﬁes PR, it is straightforward to show that ϕ(0,0) = 0 and
ϕ(x,y) ≥ 0 for all (x,y) ∈ R2
+.
ϕ(0,0) = 0 ≤ ϕ(x,y) for all (x,y) ∈ R
2
+.( 7 )
7If this were not the case, then Λ(C(F,i,α)) would not be connected, and the proof of
Case 1 would be valid to conclude.
21Let x,x0,y ∈ R++ such that x<x 0.I f ϕ(x,y) >ϕ (x0,y) then, by
the above claim, C(F,i,ϕ(x,y)) lies above C(F,i,ϕ(x0,y)). I ns u c hac a s e ,
since (x0,y) ∈ C(F,i,ϕ(x0,y)), there exists (z,t) ∈ C(F,i,ϕ(x,y)) such that
(x0,y) < (z,t). Then, (z,t) > (x,y). This contradicts Lemma 2. Thus,
ϕ(x,y) ≤ ϕ(x
0,y) for all x,x




0,y) for all x,x
0,y∈ R++ such that y<y
0.( 9 )
Finally, let (x,y),(z,t) ∈ R2
+ such that (x,y) > (z,t).B y d o w n w a r d
sloppiness, ϕ(x,y) 6= ϕ(z,t).I f ϕ(x,y) <ϕ (z,t) then, by the above claim,
C(F,i,ϕ(z,t)) lies above C(F,i,ϕ(x,y)).W e h a v e , h o w e v e r , t h a t (x,y) ∈
C(F,i,ϕ(x,y)), (z,t) ∈ C(F,i,ϕ(z,t)) and (x,y) > (z,t), which represents a
contradiction. Thus,
ϕ(x,y) >ϕ (z,t) for all (x,y),(z,t) ∈ R
2
+ such that (x,y) > (z,t).( 1 0 )
We show now that ϕ is continuous on R2
+.T o d o s o , l e t {(an,b n)}n be
a sequence in R2
+ converging to (a,b) ∈ R2
+. We must show that {αn}n =
{ϕ(an,b n)}n converges to α = ϕ(a,b). Of the three sets: Ω> = {n ∈ N :
αn >α }, Ω< = {n ∈ N : αn <α }, Ω= = {n ∈ N : αn = α}, at least one is
inﬁnite. If Ω= is the only inﬁnite set, then the claim is obviously true. So
s u p p o s et h i si sn o tt h ec a s e ;l e tΩ< be inﬁnite. (The proof if Ω> is inﬁnite is
the same.) The claim is true unless Ω< has a limit point α<α . Therefore,
suppose that this were the case. Denote by {αk} a subsequence of Ω< that
converges to α. Consider the curve C(F,i, α+α
2 ). There is a ball, B,a b o u t
(a,b) ∈ C(F,i,α) which, by the above claim, lies above this curve because
α>α+α
2 .B u tf o rl a r g ek, (aαk,b αk) ∈ B. This is impossible, since for large k,
all points in C(F,i,αk) lie below C(F,i, α+α
2 ).T h u s ,ϕ is continuous on R2
+.
This, together with (7), (8), (9) and (10), shows that ϕ ∈ Φ, as desired.
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